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Commercial Law
by Robert A. Weber, Jr.*
I.

SALES

Most issues arising under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
during the survey period concerned warranties and the proper form and
procedure for their exclusion. A precondition to consideration of Article
2 warranty rules, however, is the existence of a contract for the sale of
goods within the scope of Article 2. In Willis Mining, Inc. v. Noggle,'
plaintiff purchased granite blocks from defendant.
Plaintiff cut
monuments from the granite and sold the monuments to dealers for
eventual sale to the public. The monuments began to show signs of
discoloration within eighteen months of sale, and when defendant
refused to reimburse plaintiff for its cost in replacing the monuments,
plaintiff sued for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.2
Defendant argued that Article 2 rules governing warranty did not
apply. In particular, defendant claimed the granite blocks sold to
plaintiff were not "goods." To constitute goods within the meaning of
Article 2, defendant's argument proceeded, the goods must be "manufactured."3
The court rejected defendant's argument that goods covered by Article
2 must possess the characteristic of having been manufactured.4 First,
the test for determining the existence of goods within the meaning of
Article 2 is "whether the goods are 'movable at the time of identification

* Associate in the firm of Smith, Gilliam & Williams, Gainesville, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1991; J.D., cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994);
Editor in Chief (1993-1994). Law Clerk to the Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., United
States District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia (1994-1996). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
As with last year's article, many thanks to my wife, Laurie, for all her support.
1. 235 Ga. App. 747, 509 S.E.2d 731 (1998).
2. Id. at 748, 509 S.E.2d at 732.
3. Id. at 749, 509 S.E.2d at 733.
4. Id. at 749-50, 509 S.E.2d at 733.
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to the contract."' 5 Second, commercial code provisions addressing goods
severed from real estate explicitly cover minerals.6 Lastly, cases cited
by defendant' in support of its argument were inapposite and merely
stood for the proposition that a defendant is not liable for warranty
claims as to drugs that it neither manufactures nor prescribes.'
The court in Noggle, having determined Article 2 rules applied, also
addressed the more common Article 2 issue of the survey period: implied
warranties and disclaimer thereof.9
Defendant first argued that
plaintiff's conduct-inspecting the blocks and using his own judgment to
select the granite blocks-precluded implication of the warranty of
merchantability.'
Although such a contention might have been
relevant if plaintiff had claimed a breach of implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, it was irrelevant in the context of disclaiming
the warranty of merchantability, which can be disclaimed only by
written, conspicuous language."
Defendant also argued that the warranty of merchantability did not
apply because the defects in this case were latent, not discoverable by
buyer or seller.'2 The court summarily rejected this argument, stating
that "[u]ndisclosed latent defects ... are the very evil that the implied
warranty of merchantability was designed to remedy."" Only latent
defects discoverable by the exercise of caution on the buyer's behalf are
excluded from the warranty of merchantability, and because the evidence
at trial showed the defect in the granite blocks was not discoverable by
such efforts, the warranty still applied."
The court in North Georgia Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. L & L
Construction, Inc. 5 explored the nature of express warranties under
Article 2 in a fact-intensive opinion. Buyer and seller entered a contract
for the sale of concrete, and the parties agreed to a particular mixture
of ingredients for the concrete. Seller convinced buyer to allow it to alter
the mix, and buyer agreed, but only upon seller's agreement to revert to
the previous mix if buyer was dissatisfied. Buyer did, in fact, become

5. Id.
6. Id. at 750, 509 S.E.2d at 733.
7. Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 547, 487 S.E.2d 70 (1997); Presto v.
Charter Peachford Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 229 Ga. App. 576, 494 S.E.2d 377 (1997).
8. 235 Ga. App. at 750, 509 S.E.2d at 733-34.
9. Id. at 748, 509 S.E.2d at 732.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 749, 509 S.E.2d at 733.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 235 Ga. App. 68, 508, S.E.2d 722 (1998).
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dissatisfied and instructed seller to revert to the originally agreed upon
specifications. Seller did so, but only briefly, and thereafter continued
using the altered mix without notifying buyer.16
The originally agreed upon mixture constituted an express warranty
as a "'description of the goods which is made a part of the basis of the
bargain.'' 17 In further support of its conclusion, the court stated:
"A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of
goods, contemporaneously with and as part of the contract of sale,
though collateral to the express object of it, having reference to the
character, quality, or title of the goods, and by which he promises or
undertakes to ensure that certain facts are or shall be as he then
represents them. The warranty may be express or implied. It is the
former when created by the apt and explicit statements of the seller;
the latter, when the law derives it by implication or inference from the
nature of the transaction, or the relative situation or circumstances of
the parties.""8
Although the agreement at issue in Bailey v.Thcker Equipment Sales,
Inc. 9 was a lease governed by Article 2A, the ruling therein on
warranty disclaimers is equally applicable in the context of Article 2.20
The lease contract in Bailey included the following pertinent language:
"Lessee acknowledges that he has examined the Equipment and that
it is in good condition and repair. Lessee accepts the Equipment as is
and agrees to use reasonable care in the operation of the Equipment.
Upon termination of the rental, Lessee shall return the Equipment to
the place of business of the Lessor in as good condition
2 as when
received by the Lessee, ordinary wear and tear excepted." 1
"was not
The court stressed that the emphasized language in this quote
22
highlighted, bolded, in larger print, or otherwise set off."

To be effective, a disclaimer of a warranty implied by Article 2A must
be "'in writing and conspicuous."'23 Conspicuous means that the clause
or term "'is in larger or other contrasting type or color.' ' 24 As drafted,
the "as is" language was not conspicuous, nor was the phrase such that

16. Id. at 68-69, 508 S.E.2d at 723-24.
17. Id. at 72, 508 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-2-313(1)(b) (1994)).
18. Id. (quoting Elgin Jewelry Co. v. Estes & Dozier, 122 Ga. 807,810, 50 S.E. 939, 940
(1905)).
19. 236 Ga. App. 289, 510 S.E.2d 904 (1999).
20. Id. at 290, 510 S.E.2d at 906.
21. Id. at 289, 510 S.E.2d at 905 (emphasis supplied).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 290, 510 S.E.2d at 905 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-2A-214(3)(a) (1994)).
24. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-1-201(10) (1994)).
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a "reasonable person ought to have noticed and understood" that its
usage operated to preclude warranty rights."
II.

NOTES AND GUARANTEES

Survey cases involving notes and guarantees provided practical
guidance on several issues affecting daily practice, including representative capacity of a guarantor,26 the consideration necessary to support
a note,2" and the import of "holder in due course" status for a client in
commercial transactions.28
In Dewberry Painting Centers, Inc. v. Duron, Inc. 29 a corporate

account debtor opened two accounts with plaintiff. The
defendant, owner of the corporate account debtor, signed
purporting to be individual guarantees on such accounts.3"
first account, the guaranty stated, in relevant part: "[W]e ...

individual
documents
As to the
do hereby

jointly and severally guarantee the payment by said firm ....

IWE

jointly and severally personally guarantee the performance of the
applicant herein agreeing to the terms hereinabove stated."3 ' Beneath
this language the name of a corporate account debtor was typed, with
the individual
defendant's signature, followed by the typed word
"president."3 2 The second account guaranty contained the following
similar, although not identical, language: "[W]e the undersigned do
hereby jointly and severally guarantee the payment by said firm ....
the performance of the
I/WE jointly and severally
applicant herein agreeing to the terms hereinabove stated."33 Immediately beneath this language was the signature of the individual
defendant, followed by the handwritten title "president." However, the
name of the corporate account debtor appeared nowhere in the signature
area.

34

Because these documents had been executed prior to the revision of
Article 3, the court found the pre-revision version of the statute

25. Id. at 291, 510 S.E.2d at 906.
26. Dewberry Painting Ctrs., Inc. v. Duron, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 40, 508 S.E.2d 438
(1998).
27. Ochs v. Hoerner, 235 Ga. App. 735, 510 S.E.2d 107 (1998).
28. Fedeli v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 337, 514 S.E.2d 684 (1999).
29. 235 Ga. App. 40, 508 S.E.2d 438 (1998).
30. Id. at 40, 508 S.E.2d at 439.
31. Id. at 41-42, 508 S.E.2d at 440.
32. Id. at 42, 508 S.E.2d at 440.
33. Id. at 43, 508 S.E.2d at 440. The words "personal guarantee" had been struck
through on the contract as indicated by the blank line. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 441.
34. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 440.
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governing signatures in a representative capacity3 5 controlled.3"
According to the pre-revision version of O.C.G.A. section 11-3-403, a
signature is made in a representative capacity if "'the name of an
organization [is] preceded or followed by the name of an authorized
individual.'"37 Unless the parties establish otherwise, "the representative is personally obligated 'if the instrument names the person
represented but does not38 show that the representative signed in a
'
representative capacity. '
Applying these rules to the foregoing facts, the court found that the
first guarantee was not made individually but rather in a representative
capacity.3 s The second account guarantee, however, created a question
of fact as to the parties' intent because the organization name was
omitted.4"
The court in Ochs v. Hoerner4 ' explored the consideration necessary
to support a note. The result reached in Ochs, combined with the court's
42
holding in Tyson v. McPhail Properties,
should convince counsel that
a recital of at least nominal consideration, in addition to the standard
reference "for value received," should be included when drafting
promissory notes. In Ochs maker and payee entered a contract whereby
maker would purchase real property from a closely held corporation
controlled by payee. Maker, apparently simultaneously with execution
of the agreement, executed a $100,000 demand note to payee. Payee
testified that he never paid any funds to maker and that the note was
given as compensation for deferring closing on the referenced real
property. Neither the note nor the real property sales contract referred
to the other, and the sales contract contained a standard merger clause.
When maker did not close on the real property, payee sued on the
demand note.43
The court first ruled that, due to the merger clause, the note was to
be viewed separately from the sales contract for purposes of determining
the existence of consideration sufficient to support the note.44 Viewing
the note in isolation, the court found that defendant had rebutted the

35. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-403 (1994).
36. 235 Ga. App. at 42, 508S.E.2d at 440. See also Robert A. Weber, Jr., Commercial
Law, 50 MERCER L. REV. 193, 211 (1998).
37. 235 Ga. App. at 42, 508 S.E.2d at 440 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-3-403(3)).
38. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-3-403(2)(b)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 43, 508 S.E.2d at 441.
41. 235 Ga. App. 735, 510 S.E.2d 107 (1998).
42. 223 Ga. App. 683, 478 S.E.2d 467 (1996).
43. 235 Ga. App. at 735-36, 510 S.E.2d at 108.
44. Id. at 736, 510 S.E.2d at 108.
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presumption that the note was supported by consideration.4 5 Because
the note merely stated it was given for "value received," parol evidence
was admissible on the issue of the existence of consideration.46 Because
the maker received no funds and deferral of the closing on the real
property was something to which maker was entitled by reason of the
sales contract, no consideration existed, and the note was invalid.47
The court in Fedeli v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc.4' addressed the
prerequisites to status as a holder in due course of a check as well as the
breadth of legal protection accorded such status. Defendant extended
credit to cotton farmer's corporation, NPI, to finance operations, and in
exchange received a security interest in crops grown by NPI. Defendant
notified the gins where farmer sold cotton for NPI. Farmer also customfarmed cotton for plaintiff, who paid farmer by the acre. When
defendant became concerned about farmer's debt, it sent notices to the
gins requesting that checks be issued payable jointly to defendant and
NPI, which the gins did. Plaintiff filed an action against defendant for
restitution, alleging defendant improperly received money from cotton
sales to which plaintiff was entitled.49
Defendant claimed it was a holder in due course as to checks issued
by the gins.5 ° To qualify as a holder in due course, defendant had to
show the checks were taken "for value, in good faith, and without notice
that [they were] overdue or ha[d] been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim[s] to [them] on the part of any person."5' Concluding
that defendant satisfied this definition, the court considered plaintiff's
contention that holder in due course status did not insulate defendant
from plaintiff's claims for restitution because he sought recovery of the
proceeds, not the checks themselves.5 2 The court ruled that holder in
due course status, which insulates the holder of an instrument from all
claims, bars a "claim" of restitution that seeks recovery of a check's
proceeds.53
The court in Workman v. Sysco Food Services of Atlanta 4 addressed
the question of whether a guarantor was a "compensated surety" and

45.
46.
(1998).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id., 510 S.E.2d at 108-09.
Id. See also Robert A. Weber, Jr., Commercial Law, 50 MERCER L. REV. 193, 212
235 Ga. App. at 736-37, 510 S.E.2d at 108-09.
237 Ga. App. 337, 514 S.E.2d 684 (1999).
Id. at 337-39, 514 S.E.2d at 686-87.
Id. at 342-44, 514 S.E.2d at 689-91.
Id. at 342-43, 514 S.E.2d at 690 (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-3-302(1) (1994)).
Id. at 344, 514 S.E.2d at 691.
Id. at 345, 514 S.E.2d at 691.
236 Ga. App. 784, 513 S.E.2d 523 (1999).
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thus beyond the protection of the rule strictissimijuris,which states that
a contract of suretyship is one of strict law, "and the surety's liability
will not be extended by implication or interpretation."55 Defendant had
signed a personal guaranty on behalf of the principal debtor, an entity
in which guarantor had an ownership interest.56 The court found that
merely because the consideration for defendant's execution of a guaranty
flowed to an entity in which she had an ownership interest, this did not
result in her being a compensated surety, so that she was entitled to
protection of strictissimijuris5 7
Perhaps the most significant decision of the survey period addressed
the statute of limitations applicable to demand notes. In McNeal
Construction Co. v. Wilson,5" maker executed note A to payee on
December 1, 1986. Maker executed note B to payee on December 1,
1989. Both notes provided they would not be due and payable unless a
written demand was made. Payee made written demand on November
17, 1995 and instituted suit for recovery on the notes on July 31,
1996. 59
The sole legal question was whether the suit was barred by the statute
of limitations.6 ° Maker contended that the statute in effect when the
notes were executed, O.C.G.A. section 11-3-122(1)(b), 61 should govern.6 1 Under that code section, a cause of action on a demand note
accrued "'upon its date or, if no date is stated, on the date of issue."'63
Because the "statute of limitations on an instrument not under seal is
six years after the instrument becomes due and payable,"' the statute
of limitations would have barred payee's claim if former O.C.G.A. section
11-3-122 controlled. 5
However, effective July 1, 1996, the legislature amended O.C.G.A
section 11-3-122. The relevant code section as of that date was O.C.G.A.
section 11-3-118(b), which provided that "if demand for payment is made
to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the
obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six

55. O.C.G.A. § 10-7-3 (1994).
56. 236 Ga. App. 784, 786, 513 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1999).
57. Id.
58. 235 Ga. App. 759, 509 S.E.2d 742 (1998).
59. Id. at 759, 509 S.E.2d at 743.

60. Id.
61. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-122 (1994).
62. 235 Ga. App. at 759-60, 509 S.E.2d at 743.
63. Id. at 759, 509 S.E.2d at 743 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-3-122(1)(b)).
64. 235 Ga. App. at 759, 509 S.E.2d at 743 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (Supp. 1999)).
65. Id.
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years after the demand."" Payee argued that this provision controlled
her lawsuit, which was filed thirty days after the effective date of the
statute.6 7 The court agreed with payee and, in effect, found that
O.C.G.A. section 11-3-118(b) revived payee's time-barred action against
maker."8
The Supreme Court of Georgia has granted review of this case. 9 An
angle not considered in the court of appeals decision is a construction of
the new code section's plain language. The court of appeals stated "no
question of retroactivity is presented." 71 With due respect, the entire
question is retroactivity. The new code section provides that the statute
of limitations on demand notes begins to run "if demand for payment is
made." 7 The ruling in McNeal thus turns on what the legislature
intended by its use of the word "is." At the risk of political satire, "It
depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is." Here, the demand
notice was given well before the effective date of the new statute.72 The
question thus becomes whether the statute will be interpreted as
referring to a demand notice that is or has been sent or one that is sent,
now or after the effective date hereof. Does the statute, when it refers to
a demand notice that is sent, include notices that "have been" sent? If
not, the former code section would apply.
III.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

The court in Citizens Bank of Americus v. FederalFinancialServices,
Inc.7 1 considered the priority of a prior secured lender vis-a-vis a

subsequent purchase money lender in a specific piece of equipment. The
subsequent purchase money lender's priority in the specific collateral
turned on when the debtor acquired "possession" of the collateral, thus
triggering the running of the time period (fifteen days) in which the
purchase money lender was required to file its financing statement. 4
Debtor, a logging company, proposed to acquire a "skidder" and for
that purpose borrowed money from defendant-bank on December 5,

66. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
67. 235 Ga. App. at 759, 509 S.E.2d at 743.
68. Id. at 761, 509 S.E.2d at 744.
69. Certiorari granted April 12, 1999. The supreme court reversed the appellate court
on October 18, 1999, finding that the new statute did not apply retroactively. McNeal
Construction Co. v. Wilson, No. S99G0517, 1999 WL 824103, at *3 (Ga. Oct. 18, 1999).
70. 235 Ga. App. at 760, 509 S.E.2d at 743.
71. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis supplied).
72. 235 Ga. App. at 759, 509 S.E.2d at 743.
73. 235 Ga. App. 482, 509 S.E.2d 339 (1998).
74. Id. at 482, 509 S.E.2d at 339.
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1996. However, debtor used the loan proceeds to pay off other debts and
did not acquire the skidder. Bank, unaware of this, filed its financing
statement listing the skidder as collateral the following day. On
December 18, seller delivered the skidder to debtor for demonstration
purposes only. On December 30, debtor signed a sales contract with
seller for the skidder; however, the contract was subject to debtor
obtaining insurance listing seller and plaintiff-finance company as loss
payees. Plaintiff-finance company was to provide the purchase money
financing for the skidder. On February 6, 1997, after obtaining
insurance, debtor acquired ownership of the skidder, executed a note to
plaintiff, and signed a financing statement listing the skidder as
collateral. Plaintiff sent the loan 7 proceeds
to seller and filed the
5
financing statement on February

10.

A security interest is entitled to priority as a purchase money security
interest to the extent that it is a security interest:
"(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or
incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used."76
A purchase money security interest is entitled to priority over a
previously perfected security interest in the same collateral if the
purchase money security interest is perfected within fifteen days after
debtor "'receives possession of the collateral.' 77 As noted, the question
in these circumstances was at what point debtor received possession of
the skidder for purposes of triggering the fifteen-day period in which the
purchase money lender's financing statement had to be filed.78
The court discussed two standards for determining when a debtor
receives possession.79 Under the "obligation" standard, the court
stated:
a purchase money security interest has priority over a previously
perfected security interest, where the buyer obtains physical possession
of the property before becoming obligated to make the purchase, and
the purchase money lender's perfection of its security interest is timely

75. Id. at 483, 509 S.E.2d at 339-40.
76. Id. at 485-86, 509 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-107).
77. Id. at 482, 509 S.E.2d at 339 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-9-312(4) (1994)) (emphasis
supplied).

78. Id.
79. Id. at 484-85, 509 S.E.2d at 340-41.
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when measured from the point when the purchaser incurs the purchase
money obligation which the property secures.8"
Under the "physical control" standard, possession is determined by
reference to an easily applied objective standard suggested by the name
given to this line of cases: When did the debtor acquire physical control
of the collateral? The court noted that the former standard is typically
employed in cases involving sales on approval; the latter usually involves
"situations in which the buyer or lessee owed performance of an
obligation secured by the property at the time physical possession was
acquired.""1 The common thread in cases applying these standards,
moreover, was that none "held that the running of the grace period was
triggered before the debtor owed performance of the secured obligaheld that, "[u]nder these circumstances,
tion."82 The court thus
83
[plaintiff] has priority."
The court's opinion does not openly endorse either of the quoted
standards and suggests (implicitly) that courts should employ a case-bycase evaluation.84 In deciding which standard to apply, the court
suggested (implicitly) that the physical possession standard is the
general rule, with the obligation standard being appropriate in sale-onapproval cases.8 8 Although impossible to determine from the court's
opinion, it appears that the court applied the obligation standard
because this was a sale-on-approval case. The court attempted to
marginalize the significance of debtor's physical possession of the skidder
by characterizing the debtor as a bailee until it became a purchaser.88
The court's effort to minimize the legal significance of physical possession further supports the conclusion that the court applied the obligation
standard here. In any event, the court reached a good conclusion. Had
the time lapse between debtor's acquisition of physical possession and
perfection by the purchase money lender been greater, the opposite
result may have been more appropriate. However, the relatively brief
lapse of less than sixty days, which here seems to have been a trial
period for the equipment, between debtor's gaining physical control of
the skidder and perfection by the purchase money lender is commercially
reasonable and, thus, should be entitled to protection as a true purchase

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 485, 509 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 486, 509 S.E.2d at 342.
Id. at 487, 509 S.E.2d at 342.
Id.

84. Id. at 484, 509 S.E.2d 340 ("in analyzing when the time-triggering event occurred,
several variables must be considered"). See also id. at 487, 509 S.E.2d at 342 ("under these

circumstances").
85. Id. at 486 n.16, 509 S.E.2d at 342 n.16.
86. Id. at 483, 509 S.E.2d at 340.
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money security interest. A longer delay, however, would have weakened
the causal link between the purchase money lender's provision of
financing and the debtor's ability to acquire the collateral, i.e., it would
have seemed less like a trial period.
A survey period without a case distinguishing a lease from a security
interest would be incomplete. In Lewis v. Lease Atlanta, Inc.,8' the
court found that because lessee "was not bound to renew the lease or
become the owner of the vehicle and the residual purchase option price
was not nominal or even unreasonably low," the agreement was a true
lease and not a security interest. 88
IV. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
Survey decisions interpreting standard contract provisions provide
valuable guidance to practitioners who may, in the wake of such
decisions, revise standard clauses they use in drafting commercial
agreements.
In Akintobi v. Phoenix Fire Restoration Co.,89 parties to litigation
involving a breach of contract agreed to binding arbitration. Both sides
requested that attorney fees be awarded in arbitration, even though
neither the contract nor the arbitration agreement provided for such
fees. Over objection of the losing party, the trial court subsequently
affirmed the arbitrator's award, which included attorney fees.9 ° The
court of appeals affirmed the fee award, notwithstanding absence of a
contractual authorization of such fees, because it found that the parties
implicitly agreed to arbitrate the fee issue. 9' For those instances where
the adversary is unwilling to arbitrate fees, implicitly or otherwise,
Akintobi serves as a reminder to include in any contract clause
regarding arbitration a statement regarding the authority (or lack
thereof) of an arbitrator to enter a fee award.
The court in Gibson v. Decatur Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n9 also
addressed attorney fee clauses, albeit in the context of a deed to secure
debt. In Gibson lender-grantee of a deed to secure debt erroneously
marked as paid the note evidencing the debt for which the deed to secure
debt was given. After debtor-grantor refused to voluntarily reform the
note, lender filed an action seeking reformation of the note. Eventually
successful, lender sought recovery of attorney fees against debtor under

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

234 Ga. App. 812, 508 S.E.2d 188 (1998).
Id. at 814, 508 S.E.2d at 190.
236 Ga. App. 760, 513 S.E.2d 507 (1999).
Id. at 761, 513 S.E.2d at 508.
Id.
235 Ga. App. 160, 508 S.E.2d 788 (1998).
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the terms of the deed to secure debt, which contained the following
language:
If borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained
in this security instrument, or there is a legal proceeding that may
significantly affect lender's rights in the property (such as proceeding
in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or to enforce laws or
regulations), the lender may do and pay for whatever is necessary to
protect the value of the property and lender's rights in the property.
Lender's actions may include paying any sum secured by a lien which
has priority over this security instrument, appearing in court, paying
reasonable attorney's fees and entering on the property to make
repairs. 3
The court found that this language only entitled lender:
to a reimbursement of expenditures that it may make to protect itself
from actions over which the lender has no control, i.e., if the borrower,
through no fault of the lender, fails to perform the covenants and
agreements contained in the deed to secure debt or if a proceeding is
initiated by the borrower or by a third party against the borrower that
affects the lender's rights in the property. 4
Because this proceeding was one to correct the lender's fault, it was not
within the scope of the contract provision authorizing attorney fees.95
Counsel would be well advised to include in their standard forms
phraseology to cover such events.
9
The court in Sage Technology, Inc. v. NationsBank N.A. South 6
construed as consistent two clauses in a contract dealing with the
disposition of earnest money. Plaintiff-buyer and defendant-seller
entered a contract for the sale of realty. The contract was organized by
section headings.
One section, entitled "Conditions to Closing,"
contained the following clause: "'If this Agreement is terminated
pursuant to the right of either party to terminate this Agreement, the
Earnest Money will be promptly refunded to [buyer] and neither party
shall have any further obligations under this Agreement.'"97 Another
section, entitled "Default," contained the following clause: "'If [buyer]
breaches this Agreement, [seller], as [its] sole remedy and relief
hereunder, may terminate this Agreement and thereupon receive the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 162-63, 508 S.E.2d at 791.
Id. at 163, 508 S.E.2d at 791.
Id., 508 S.E.2d at 791-92.
235 Ga. App. 405, 509 S.E.2d 694 (1998).
Id. at 406 n.1, 509 S.E.2d at 696 n.1.
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Earnest Money as liquidated damages."'98 When buyer failed to make
an additional earnest money payment required by an amendment
extending the closing date, seller terminated the agreement and claimed
the earnest money then on deposit as liquidated damages under the
latter clause. Buyer sued for return of its earnest money.99
Buyer contended that a conflict existed between the foregoing
provisions. 10 0 The court disagreed and relied upon the sections of the
agreement in which the respective clauses were located to explain any
ambiguity. 10 ' The, former provision, providing for a return of the
earnest money, was within the section giving "the parties options for
terminating the deal for reasons other than default during the Agreement's executory period."0 2 By contrast, the other provision was found
in the section dealing with "respective remedies in case of default."0 3
The court thus found the provisions consistent, with one directing
"disposition of the earnest money in case of termination by either party
as a matter of right, [and the other directing] disposition of the earnest
money in case of termination by reason of default."0 4
The court's holding highlights the need for including (or, contrariwise,
the rationale for excluding) a provision negating the interpretive effect
to be accorded section headings within an agreement. 10 5 Many practitioners surely view such a clause as meaningless boilerplate. The buyer
in Sage Technology undoubtedly does not subscribe to that belief after
the opinion from the court of appeals.
The survey period emphasized the significance of other provisions
usually considered to be boilerplate and otherwise not worthy of
consideration. The decision in Zampatti v. Tradebank International
Franchising Corp.'°6 demonstrated the significance of a survivability
clause, which provides for the survival of covenants as obligations
independent of the agreement in which they are contained in the event
the agreement is breached or terminated.

98. Id. at 406, 509 S.E.2d at 696.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 406-07, 509 S.E.2d at 696-97.
102. Id. at 407, 509 S.E.2d at 696.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The court does not mention the existence of such a clause in this case. The
absence of such a clause is curious, as it is practically a boilerplate provision in most
sophisticated agreements.
106. 235 Ga. App. 333, 508 S.E.2d 750 (1998).
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COLLECTION ISSUES

In Morgan v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.," °7 creditor sued debtor for
amounts due and owing under the terms of a motor vehicle installment
sales contract. Although the contract was attached to the complaint, the
complaint was unverified, did not recite the manner in which the
amount sought (principal, interest, attorney fees, and costs) had been
08
calculated, and did not recite debtor's account payment history.
Thus, even though creditor was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, °9 it was nevertheless incumbent upon creditor to substantiate its
claim with evidence. Had the complaint contained more thorough
information and been verified in the first instance, many headaches
would have been avoided.
The decision in Zampatti is instructive on the proper cause of action
to pursue in a collection matter. The court distinguished between action
on open account and a claim in quantum meruit:
An open account is one in which some item of contract is not settled by
the parties. Black defines an open account as one which has not been
finally settled or closed, but is still running or open to future adjustment or liquidation. Georgia law agrees with this definition. Absent
a contractual relationship an action on open account is not the proper
theory of recovery and procedure to use. A suit on an open account
may be maintained for the price of goods sold under a contract where
the price has been agreed upon by the seller and purchaser and where
the seller has performed his part of the agreement and nothing
remains to be done except for the purchaser to make payment. A suit
on an open account may be based on either an express or implied
promise to pay.110

A claim in quantum meruit is, by contrast, appropriate where the value
of the goods and services provided is in dispute."'
The court's decision in Speir v. Krieger"2 demonstrates that a
corporate officer is not completely shielded from liability because of the
corporate form. Plaintiff in Speir had sued defendant corporation for
purposes of piercing the corporate veil. Even though the corporate
secretary was not a party to the action, the trial court's judgment, which

107. 237 Ga. App. 257, 514 S.E.2d 239 (1999).
108. Id. at 258, 514 S.E.2d at 241.
109. Id. Plaintiff did not seek default judgment, but rather judgment on the pleadings,
as defendant had filed an answer. Id.
110. 235 Ga. App. at 343-44, 508 S.E.2d at 760 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
111. Id. at 344, 508 S.E.2d at 760.
112. 235 Ga. App 392, 509 S.E.2d 684 (1998).
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disregarded the corporate entity, was binding upon him. 113 More
significantly, the court found that in the subsequent action against the
corporate secretary in his individual capacity, the trial court had
properly entered summary judgment for plaintiff against the secretary.1" 4 In particular, the summary judgment ruling rendered the
secretary personally liable for the corporation's debt to plaintiff
notwithstanding the secretary's testimony that he had resigned from the
corporation prior to the conduct giving rise to plaintiff's injury.1 ' The
court discounted the secretary's testimony as self-serving and conclusory
and relied principally upon the corporation's registry on file with the
Secretary of State, required to be updated annually, showing the
secretary was still listed as corporate officer and as registered agent." 6
In light of this evidence, and considering that the secretary "did not
tender a copy of his alleged notice of resignation; ... did not submit an
affidavit from any other corporate officer stating [his] name was
inadvertently left on the corporate registry; [and, in fact] submitt[ed]
nothing," the court held that the corporate officer was personally

liable.

117

VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

The decision in White v. Cauthen"5s did not fall within any of the
foregoing headings. However, failure to include it would have been a
waste. Succinctly stated, the court in White reiterated the rule that, in
the context of a contractor's waiver of lien rights,
"[An affidavit regular on its face, but challenged on the ground it was
not properly sworn to or notarized, is as a matter of law sufficient if
there is an absence of any evidence indicating that the owner was
aware of the irregularity, or allegations and proof of fraud and/or collusion. 19
In light of the above, the court found that a contractor's affidavit,
notwithstanding the absence of a jurat, was sufficient to preclude the
contractor's12 subsequent action against the homeowners for additional
sums due.

113. Id. at 399-400, 509 S.E.2d at 690-91.
114. Id. at 398-99, 509 S.E.2d at 689-90.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 397-98, 509 S.E.2d at 689.
117. Id. at 398, 509 S.E.2d at 690.
118. 235 Ga. App. 245, 509 S.E.2d 140 (1998).
119. Id. at 246, 509 S.E.2d at 141-42 (quoting Walk Softly v. Hyzer, 188 Ga. App. 230,
233, 372 S.E.2d 500, 502-03 (1988) (emphasis supplied)).
120. Id. at 247, 509 S.E.2d at 142.

